

# DISPATCH

# SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T RYBAT

## PROCESSING

PRO-  
POSED

ACTION

ACCOM-  
PLISHED

TO Chief, EE

INFO. Chief of Station, Germany

FROM Chief, Munich Liaison Base

SUB RYBAT CATIDE UJRANDOM

Transmittal of Contact Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED  
HEADQUARTERS DESK  
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

ABSTRACT

MICROFILM

Attached are five recent contact reports concerning UJRANDOM matters,  
including four meetings with @FLEMING and one with @CASTROP.

## Attachments:

- A. @CASTROP and ☐ 6 August 1963, USC  
B. @FLEMING and ☐ 4 September 1963, USC  
C. @FLEMING and ☐ 11 September 1963, USC  
D. @FLEMING and ☐ 23 September 1963, HEREWITH  
E. @FLEMING and ☐ 7 September 1963, HEREWITH

APPROVED: ☐

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3821  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2008

## Distribution:

- 2 - Chief, EE w/atts. D&E, HEREWITH; A-C, USC, single copy each  
2 - COS/G w/atts. D&E, HEREWITH; A-C, USC, single copy each

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED

2 Oct. 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

EGMA-63087

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

32W-5-38/18

# SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

ATTACHMENT A.

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CONTACT REPORT

@CASTROP and [ ]  
Haltestelle, 1030-1050 hours  
6 August 1963  
Ops Discussion

1. Gurt BOETTIGER: See EGMA-62682.

2. UJDRYROT: The main reason for the meeting was to pass the CALLIKAK on Subject. Of interest were a conversation in which Subject told "Felix" that they were no longer working for UPHILL and their apparent lack of concern over this and secondly, a call in which Subject tries to find out where he can buy a paper-shredder.

3. [ ] I also called CASTROP's attention to a letter received by Subject from his Freiburg/Sa friend Lemhen ZIPKE which merely wishes Subject a good weekend. We both agreed this was rather unusual.

4. WALZ/LOELLGEN/SCHMITZ: CASTROP explained that SCHMITZ had been the tipper who recommended LOELLGEN to UPHILL. WALZ was sent to recruit LOELLGEN as a spotter for stay-behind agents. LOELLGEN had been most unproductive and apparently never made any efforts to get further into the UPHILL fold. It therefore seems unlikely that LOELLGEN has any RIS mission to penetrate UPHILL unless he has other UPHILL contacts as yet undiscovered. Of possible interest in this respect is the fact that UJDRYROT was with the KRIPO in Danzig from 1921 to 1934 and both LOELLGEN and UJDRYROT were in Trier after the war. However, to the best of my knowledge no current contact between the two has been revealed. This will be pursued with UPHILL.

Distribution:

- 1 - C/EE
- 1 - COS/G
- 1 - C/MLB
- 1 - L/OPS

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ATTACHMENT B.

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CONTACT REPORT

FLEMING and ☐ ☐  
Haltestelle - 1600-1810 hours  
4 September 1963

1. The first case discussed was the case of Dr. Guenther Prey. The following points were covered:

a. I told Fleming that Prey had been arrested by the Italians and briefed him in general terms on the background of the case. Specific points mentioned were Prey's relationship with Wennerstrom, his previous contact with known RU officers in Holland, his strange behavior in Switzerland and Stockholm, and our strong suspicion that he is an active RIS agent. I also mentioned that the interrogation of Prey is not making much progress and that we badly need ammunition for the interrogation officers. In this context I showed him a copy of our Blue No. 29187, which had previously been passed to @uergen by Neale and which Fleming said he had already seen. I also passed him a copy of our Blue No. 29333 for UPHILL retention.

b. Next I described in general terms KUBARK's role as broker in this case, and explained that we had assumed the role only because the Swedish State Security Police did not themselves have the facilities or foreign liaison necessary to broker a case with such wide ramifications. I also remarked (in the hope of provoking a response), that our job as broker was not an easy one and had caused a tremendous volume of cable traffic and some frayed tempers between the KUBARK stations involved. Fleming replied that the responsible UPHILL officers had at first not clearly understood our role in the case and had been a little miffed about it, but that this misunderstanding had already been cleared up.

c. I then switched the conversation to Prey's home in Utting and said we very much desired to conduct a thorough search of it but that it was unlikely this could be arranged legally through the BfV. We were therefore exploring the possibility of conducting a clandestine search, and I asked what UPHILL's capabilities were in this field. Fleming replied that UPHILL did not have such a capability and reminded me that during the UJDROWSY case UPHILL had had to request assistance of this type from us. Without saying so directly, he implied that UPHILL would also be very reluctant to get involved in such an endeavor.

d. Finally, I asked if UPHILL was coordinating with the BfV on the case. Fleming said no; however, he later remarked that he knew the BfV had been able to supply more data on the case than had UPHILL, so it would seem that some coordination actually has taken place. Fleming had not previously heard of Prey's arrest, so it is clear that there has been no coordination in depth or recently, and I assume this is what Fleming had in mind when answering my question. Fleming asked if I thought it would be a good idea for UPHILL to get together with the BfV on the case, and after some reflection I said I would suggest his doing so. Since the BfV and the ASBW have passed us information on a number of people who have apparently not been traced with UPHILL, it seemed

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possible to me that UPHILL might be able to contribute something of value, and that the best way to affect this was for the German services to get together. Flem said he would send a cable to the BfV on 5 September stating that we had informed UPHILL of Prey's arrest, and offering to cooperate in any way UPHILL could in pushing the investigation.

X 2. Josef Hartmannsgruber was the next case discussed, and Fleming said he had determined that the letters Hartmannsgruber wrote to East Berlin had been sent with the approval of his UPHILL superior. While this cleared Hartmannsgruber of suspicion, Fleming said that the idea of writing the letters had been completely idiotic since Hartmannsgruber was blown to the MFS and his letters were written in such a naive manner that they wouldn't have deceived any one about his intentions. Gratuitously he added that I would see many examples of such stupidity in my work with his organization. I asked if he had any comment on the previous listing of Hartmannsgruber's address by the German Soviet Friendship Society and Fleming in surprise said that he had not heard about that. He said he would check and let me know.

X 3. Fleming said that in the C I case the letter from Willi Walter to Dr. Josef Drescher had been identified as one mailed at UPHILL's direction. I didn't know the background of the case so Fleming suggested I pass the information on to Schrieves. Fleming had nothing new to report on the C I case except that UPHILL is planning another LCFLUTTER. This one hopefully to be accompanied by at least a mild interrogation.

X 4. I passed Fleming copies of our Blue No. 29317 on fnu Jagusch and our Blue No. 29153 on the surveillance of Gregor's daughter in Berlin. A short conversation on the case followed without anything new coming out of it.

X 5. I said I had recently scanned a couple of Rischke's intercepts and had deduced from this that UPHILL was trying to find new jobs for some of their employees in private firms. I asked if this was part of a 701 program, and Fleming answered, "yes, indeed" and that UPHILL has been pushing a 701 program for some time. The program is designed to eliminate people who have committed security infractions (falsification of PRQ data is the most frequent dereliction), but are not suspected of active disloyalty. Many of the people eliminated are transferred to other government offices where they have no access to classified information. The most serious cases are either helped or advised to find employment in private firms and warned not to apply again for government employment.

X 6. Fleming passed me his Blue No. 100/63 (attached), and I said I would try to identify the occupants of the Am Com Lib vehicle. Fleming then described in some detail Gregor's repeated visits to the forest near Dachau and UPHILL's thus far vain attempts to determine what he does there.

7. This led to my asking Fleming about surveillance assets and he replied that UPHILL has a well-trained team made up of fully cleared staff employees. The team is led by a retired Kriminal Sekretaer and is fully equipped with vehicles, communications gear, etc. The team is used only on

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staff security cases and its existence is a tightly held secret with UPHILL. Only Fleming, Bernhardt and Fronhoff are allowed to contact the team.

\* 8. Fleming next passed his Blue 99/63 which requests us to ask the Dutch to initiate an investigation of Jacob Figuee. Since I did not know the background of the case, Fleming explained that Figuee and his wife had been tentatively identified as the two people Bulla and wife met in Holland at Easter, 1958. We previously asked for traces on Figuee from the Dutch in UPHILL's behalf and received negative replies. Fleming now requested us to ask the Dutch to initiate a more detailed investigation of Figuee. He said he had no objection to our revealing to the Dutch, as reason for the investigation, that Figuee was suspect of being in contact with a known Polish IS agent. If the Dutch could come up with some evidence that Figuee was also a Polish agent, Fleming hoped it might provide an opening for a renewed UPHILL investigation of the Bullas. The only things Fleming asked me not to reveal to the Dutch was the fact that we were requesting the investigation on behalf of UPHILL and that an UPHILL staffer was involved. I said I would check the background of the case and if at all possible would relay his request to the Dutch in the form he wanted.

9. Fleming returned to me the tape of a telephone intercept in Esperanto. He said that Fronhoff, despite his study of Esperanto, was unable to understand the tape and he asked if we had anyone in our office who knew Esperanto and could make a transcript. I said I would check and let him know.

10. Nothing else of a business nature was discussed and the last moments of the meeting were passed in personal conversation. Fleming was frank and friendly throughout the meeting and I was interested to see that his general low opinion of UPHILL and revulsion at recent German history, which [ ] frequently commented on, are gradually creeping into his remarks to me. All in all I am much impressed with Fleming and am looking forward to some productive work with him.

[ ]

Typed: 6 September 1963

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ATTACHMENT C.

RYBAT

CONTACT REPORT

OFLEMING and [ ]  
Haltestelle, 1500-1715 hours  
11 September 1963

1. FLEMING called the meeting in order to request special CALLIKAK coverage on three individuals listed in his Blue 103/63.

2. They are: Paul BRENDL. He is an UPHILL staffer who has been under investigation for well over a year. The suspicion against him dates back to 1946-48 when he was a principal agent for one of the American military intelligence services collecting OB information in East Germany. The director of the AIS net in which BRENDL worked was a man named MICHAEL. MICHAEL worked out of West Berlin and had a girl friend, one Evalina HESS, in East Berlin. He frequently visited HESS in East Berlin and during one of his visits he was arrested. The sources he was handling in East Germany were soon arrested also, and a short time later both MICHAEL and his sources were given a show trial and sentenced to prison. As in many of the cases of this type, no one has ever been able to determine conclusively whether MICHAEL's arrest was real or a fake designed to cover previous activity as a hostile penetration of AIS.

3. BRENDL was not involved in the MICHAEL flap, and the suspicion against him is due only to the suspicion against MICHAEL. If MICHAEL was a hostile penetration, the opposition would probably not have withdrawn him unless they had a replacement in the same net, who could have been BRENDL.

4. BRENDL has been employed by UPHILL since about 1956-57 and now works in one of the Dienststellen in Munich. He has the reputation of being a very correct and intelligent employee and the UPHILL investigation of him has not turned up anything of very great significance. One thing which seems a little suspicious is a series of marks in his desk calendar. BRENDL makes these marks on certain days in the middle of each month, sometimes putting them in after the month has passed. The marks cannot be explained in terms of his UPHILL duties, and while he may have a perfectly innocent private reason for them, UPHILL suspects that they could be reminders or a record of clandestine contacts. Lending weight to this theory is the fact that the marks became much less frequent during a recent period when a number of persons in BRENDL's Dienststelle were fired.

5. One other possibly suspicious incident which was turned up by the UPHILL surveillance team was BRENDL's curious behavior one evening in the bar of the Wuertemberger Hof. He sat down alone at a table in the bar, spread out his cigarettes, lighter, and other objects in a way which suggested a recognition signal, and sat back apparently expecting someone to join him. However, while this incident looked like an aborted clandestine contact, it is also possible that it had a perfectly innocent explanation.

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OFLEMING

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6. In an effort to resolve BRENDDEL's case which is getting nowhere fast, UPHILL has made plans to provoke him this weekend. He will be told about 1200, Friday, 13 September that UPHILL expects a high-ranking Russian officer, someone on the level of ARLADLE, to defect from Budapest to Vienna the night of Sunday, 15 September. BRENDDEL will be instructed to gather a surveillance/guard team of 4-6 people and dispatch them to Vienna on Saturday, 14 September to take over the defector (when he arrives) from the UPHILL station in Vienna and escort him to Germany. BRENDDEL's superior is on leave so one of the UPHILL officers cut in on the investigation can give BRENDDEL these orders. Since BRENDDEL has been used on other assignments of this type, it is unlikely that this assignment will make him suspicious.

7. The information about the Russian officer should compel BRENDDEL, if he is a hostile agent, to make an emergency contact with his handling officer. UPHILL therefore plans to watch him very carefully Friday afternoon in the office, and pick him up with a surveillance team when he leaves. The most critical period is from Friday noon to Saturday noon, when BRENDDEL's surveillance/guard team will depart for Vienna. However, UPHILL will continue the surveillance until 1800 Saturday when BRENDDEL will be told that the Russian officer is not coming and the operation is off.

8. To aid the UPHILL operation, FLEMING requested that we arrange to have CALLIKAK monitor BRENDDEL's phone with special care from Friday noon to Sunday evening and inform him immediately if anything significant is intercepted. He also requested the same coverage for the same period on Harry STAAKE, an UPHILL officer with whom BRENDDEL is closely befriended. I told FLEMING that we would certainly do all we could to help him. Since then ☐ has made the necessary arrangements with CALLIKAK and FLEMING has been informed of this.

EXTRACT: Paul BRENDDEL

9. The third case FLEMING wanted special coverage on was GREGOR. GREGOR's vacation begins on Friday, 13 September, and as usual, he is driving to Italy via Switzerland. Since the shortest way to Italy is not via Switzerland, and since GREGOR has already taken the long way a number of times, UPHILL suspects that he has some special reason for visiting Switzerland, most likely something to do with a Swiss bank account. Although it is going to be easy to do, UPHILL wants to try to survey GREGOR in Switzerland this trip. The task is difficult because GREGOR drives a fast Mercedes, he may use any one of four crossing points, and the UPHILL surveillance vehicles with two-way radios cannot be driven into Switzerland to help with the surveillance. FLEMING asked if we would give GREGOR's telephone special coverage from Friday, 13 September to Monday, 16 September. GREGOR is taking his wife and possibly a friend so there may be something in his telephone coverage indicating his exact time of departure. While GREGOR's vacation begins on Friday, FLEMING doesn't expect him to leave on that date since he is superstitious and very unlikely to start a trip on Friday the thirteenth. That means that if he wants to get to a Swiss bank

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OFLEMING

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11 September 1963

on Saturday he will have to leave here very early (not later than 0630) on Saturday morning; or he can wait until Monday morning and start then. I told FLEMING that we would also do all we could to help on this case, and as with BRENDL and STAAKE, ☐ ☐ has already made the necessary arrangements with CALLIKAK.

10. In discussing the GREGOR case, FLEMING remarked that GREGOR and his wife were out to their favorite woods again last week. They met another couple and talked briefly, and the UPHILL surveillance team got the license number of the other couple's car and it is now being checked out. GREGOR's daughter was fired on 1 August; the cover reason for her termination was the false vacation address she gave when she went to North Germany for her abortion. FLEMING said she wasn't particularly concerned about being fired since she is a good secretary and can get a job anywhere. GREGOR was called on the carpet at the same time as his daughter, since the vacation address she listed was one of his operational contacts. This rather minor security breach will be used as an excuse to transfer GREGOR to less sensitive work. After his return from vacation and probably for the remainder of his UPHILL career, GREGOR is going to be analysing overt press material.

11. In answer to a specific question from me, FLEMING said that he couldn't really tell if GREGOR was aware that he was under investigation. He gives no sign that he is aware of it but he is good at dissimulation and frequently pretends to know less than he does. By rights he should be aware of the investigation, since enough strange things have happened recently to tip him off. Among these are his daughter's making the KUBARK surveillance in Berlin, her termination by UPHILL and his own pending transfer.

EXTRACT: GREGOR

12. FLEMING passed me his Blue 102/63 asking that we discontinue CALLIKAK coverage on ☐ ☐ He also passed his BLUE 101/63 asking for Berlin Document Center checks on Karl Georg WELLHOENER. He made oral requests for information on our CALLIKAK coverage on Herbert HOESSELBARTH and for the name of the person who has Munich telephone number 89169. These requests are being processed.

EXTRACT: ☐ ☐

Herbert HOESSELBARTH  
K. G. WELLHOENER

13. FLEMING said that he had, in accordance with my suggestion, cabled CAVATA and asked if UPHILL could be of help in the investigation of Guenter PREY. He said CAVATA responded by asking for traces on two people involved in the case: Evaline HAECK and the GEYER family in Utting. UPHILL had no information on either.

EXTRACT: PREY

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OFLEMING

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11 September 1963

14. I asked if UPHILL was making any progress on the damage report they are preparing on the UJDROWSY case. FLEMING answered that they are working on it and he would give me a copy of it if he could. I asked how to say damage report in German, and after some reflection he said Pannenbericht was probably the best translation. Facetiously he then remarked that I could judge the caliber of his service by the fact that they didn't even have a name for such an essential exercise.

EXTRACT: UJDROWSY

15. I passed FLEMING our latest collection of intercepts and called his attention to the one described in EGMA-62971. His response was forwarded in EGMA-62855.

16. I gave FLEMING for his perusal a short note from [ ] containing questions about a memorandum @CASTROP passed us in FLEMING's absence. The matter concerned Dr. Hermann KRAUTZ and his involvement in Fall UNKRAUT, a fact which was apparently unknown to Frl. KUNZE. FLEMING said he would look into the matter and let me know.

EXTRACT: Dr. KRAUTZ

17. I passed FLEMING our Blue #29334 concerning [ ] contacts in South and Central America and #29338 on Herbert GOHECKY and our #29339 concerning KGB OWL schedules. No significant discussion resulted.

EXTRACT: [ ]  
GREGOR

18. This completed the business discussion and we then spent a few moments chatting about U. S. and German universities. As previously, FLEMING was friendly and spoke quite openly. I was surprised that he passed the information discussed in paragraph 15. I will try to get him on this topic again during the next meeting.

[ ]

Distribution:

- 1 - C/EE
- 1 - COS/G
- 1 - C/MLB
- 1 - DC/MLB
- 1 - L/OPS
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## CONTACT REPORT

@FLEMING and [ ]  
Haltestelle, 1045-1115 hours  
23 September 1963

1. GREGOR: I informed FLEMING that CALLIKAK had not been forwarding copies of GREGOR's mail since it consisted only of routine bills and advertisements. I told him that I had requested CALLIKAK to forward everything for the time being.

2. Lothar GREIL: I drew FLEMING's attention to a GREIL intercept dated 16-18 September in which mention was made of a forthcoming meeting between GREIL, UJDYROT, FELIX and General BITTRICH.

3. Otto KUNZE: Intercept dated 13-17 September revealed Frl. MUENZ's concern that a letter from Frau KUNZE to Frl. MUENZ had been opened. FLEMING allowed as how one of his boys might have done the dirty deed.

4. Herbert HOESSELBARTH: I told FLEMING we would be interested in the hot military invention which HOESSELBARTH is to get from Ferdinand DEU TSCH. We agreed we would split the profits.

5. UTILITY Request for Data and Meeting: FLEMING explained that he only wanted a listing of CALLIKAK being carried out for CATIDE since he did not want to go around asking @PETERSEN, @ACKERMANN, etc. I told FLEMING the only ones above and beyond those being run for him and @HERMSDORF, i.e. UJRANDOM, were Werner KATTE for @BERNHARDT and the Yugoslav Consulate. I said I would check and that [ ] would bring any additions to the list. (Addition made of Polish TM, Frankfurt). FLEMING asked if we had ever provided CALLIKAK to any CATIDE section other than his, PETERSEN's or ACKERMANN's. I said that the only exception I could think of was one case for @WINTERSTEIN, Dr. Friedrich KAUL.

6. 155/FOERTSCH, Volker: FLEMING said that his wife had had her third miscarriage on 20 September. She is at the Privatklinik Dr. Frohwein, Munich/Obermenzing, Hofbauernstr. 15. They have been told that she should not get pregnant again since they have the wrong Rh combination.

EXTRACT: 155/Foertsch, Volker

7. Other material passed: Blue #29364, 17 September 1963 - Horst WILFERT  
Blue #29365, 19 September 1963 - Hans KROTKI.

I also mentioned that KROTKI had a radio background.

Bill from CALLIKAK for DM 48.38 to cover overtime coverage for BRENDL, STAAKE, etc.

Typed: 24 September 1963

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ATTACHMENT E.

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CONTACT REPORT

RESTRICTED TO

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@Fleming and [ ]  
[ ] home, 1400-1515 hours  
27 September 1963

Remove from Project  
CS Classification: 32W-2-28/1  
JEP # 66-813/97  
Box: 26 Folder 9

1. The meeting was at Fleming's request. After he arrived I poured him coffee and we spent a few moments talking about interior decorating before turning to business. Then I brought up the case of Gerhard Ferdinand KULLACK, the U.S. citizen who lives near UTILITY and whom UTILITY suspects of spying on him. I assured Fleming again that our checks on Kullack had not turned up any evidence whatsoever of AIS connections. Fleming seemed to accept this. Then I mentioned that our files contained no information on Kullack's employers and associates and asked if Fleming could supply any data on this. Fleming said he would see what he could do.

2. Next I passed Fleming our Blue No. 29391, which asked for information on the Bundesgrenzschutz monitoring of a hostile radio set in Dachau. This provoked the following comments from Fleming: The BGS has three fixed stations (at Kiel, Rosenheim and Bonn) for monitoring agent radios. In 1955 they first picked up an agent radio in the general area of Dachau. However, because of the radio's distance from the three monitoring stations, the BGS could not locate it more closely than in an area about 30 to 40 miles square north of Munich. The agent who used this radio was in two-way contact with a station near East Berlin and also received OWVL messages. The BGS determined that the OWVL messages were coming to this particular agent when one of his messages, using the same call sign, was sent to him through both OWVL and clandestine radio. About 1960 the agent got a mechanical (I assume squirt) transmitter, and since that time the BGS, despite their use of mobile equipment, has found it very difficult to DF him. They have pinpointed him at times at places as far different from each other as Dachau, Tutzing, Fuerstenfeldbruck and Solln. The last message they intercepted was about April or May of this year. Fleming does not know definitely, but suspects that this agent radio may be involved in the @Gregor case, since Gregor spends so much of his free time in the Dachau area.

3. Fleming said he could not say definitely that the Dachau radio was not identical with the AIS radio DF-ed at Solln, but that he did not believe the two radios were identical. I thought that Fleming, at this point, would repeat his request for information on AIS agent transmissions, but he did not do so and I didn't raise the matter either. Fleming agreed to pull together all available information on the OWVL traffic sent to the Dachau agent in order to help us identify the hostile service handling him.

4. I passed Fleming our Blue No. 29368 which requested traces on a number of persons listed in Dr. Gunther Prey's correspondence. Fleming promised to trace the names soonest and asked how the Prey case was coming. I told him not very good.

5. I passed Fleming our Blue No. 29367 which contains a no-trace reply on Herbert Gorecky. Fleming said thanks. He passed me his Blue 105/63 which con-

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tains additional information on Gorecky and asked for CATHINK and Berlin EMA checks on him. I agreed to procure them.

6. Fleming mentioned the recent arrest of Georges Paques, a French press officer in NATO, and asked if this was due to AELADLE information. He added that the Paques case had been discussed by several CATIDE officers that morning and everyone was very interested in knowing if AELADLE was the person who put the finger on Paques, since this would establish AELADLE's bona fides in CATIDE eyes and lead to a re-evaluation of the information he had given CATIDE. In accordance with Headquarters instructions, I said I didn't know anything more about the case than I read in the newspapers. I plan to write a teletape to Headquarters asking for permission to tell Fleming that AELADLE was responsible.

X 7. Fleming said that according to CATIDE files, Hans Krotki, the AMCOMLIB employee whose car was seen near Gregor's, has a police record. Fleming asked if I had any objections to CATIDE's tracing Krotki with the Kripo to get details of the record. I told him to go ahead; Krotki is a German citizen and there is no reason why a German organization could not pull his police file if they want to.

8. Fleming passed me his Blue 106/63 which forwarded five copies of Attachments B and C to the previous CATIDE study on the UJDROWSY case. Among other things, the Attachments contain considerable data on the KGB officers who ran the case. I will dispatch the Attachments to the recipients of the previous UJDROWSY report.

X 9. Fleming passed me his Blue 104/63 and 109/63 which requested termination of CALLIKAK coverage on Kilian Rupprecht, Willi Litzenberg, Otto Kunze and Alfred Wenzel. In a handwritten note he requested termination of CALLIKAK on Alex Mirau, Oskar Staebel and Hartmann Lauterbacher.

X 10. Fleming passed me his Blue 110/63, which contained information on Paul Heinz Brendel's intelligence background and requested additional information from the AIS service which previously employed him. I told Fleming we would do what we could but that he shouldn't expect much since not many files were kept in the days immediately after the war and many of those have since been destroyed.

X 11. Fleming passed me his Blue 107/63 which requested traces on Osman Omer and Achum Jultschy, two Tartar deserters from the Soviet army who now live in Munich. Omer's shop was recently visited twice by Gregor, and Jultschy has been accused of having treasonable connections. I said I would get the traces as soon as I could.

12. That completed the business discussion and we chatted on personal topics for the next 15 or 20 minutes. Fleming was as agreeable as ever but in rather poor spirits since his wife had had her third miscarriage only a few days previously and was still in the hospital. The doctors have forbidden her to try for any more

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children and this will mean a childless marriage which is not to the liking of either of them. As soon as Fleming's wife recovers, we plan to get together socially.



Typed: 1 October 1963

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